The international food standards setting organisation, the Codex Alimentarius, defines risk analysis as a process with three components, namely risk assessment, risk management and risk communication (4).
The Joint Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/World Health Organization (WHO) Expert Consultation on the Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters identified the elements and guiding principles for effective risk communication and examined barriers to be overcome, as well as providing detailed practical recommendations to improve communications on food safety (6) .
The goals of risk communication
These goals can be defined as follows:
-to promote awareness and understanding of the specific issues under consideration during the risk analysis process, by all participants -to promote consistency and transparency in arriving at and implementing risk management decisions -to provide a sound basis for understanding the risk management decisions proposed or implemented -to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the risk analysis process -to contribute to the development and delivery of effective information and education programmes, when they are selected as risk management options -to foster public trust and confidence in the safety of the food supply chain -to strengthen working relationships and mutual respect among all participants -to promote the appropriate involvement of all interested parties in the risk communication process -to exchange information on knowledge, attitudes, values, practices and perceptions of interested parties concerning risks associated with food and related topics.
Brunk cites two views of risk communication (2) . The one view considers risk communication as the expert education of nonexperts, i.e. the means by which regulators convince the public to adopt the reliability of the expert assessment of the risks, the reliability of the risk management and the consequent acceptability of the risks. The second view refers to risk communication as an exchange of information between regulators and those who have a 'stake' in the process. This exchange of information is the process by which the acceptability of the risk by the lay public is negotiated and established.
These views are echoed by the Consumers' Association (UK): 'Risk communication is all too often a one-way, top-down process rather than a two-way inclusive process that enables the public to participate in decisions about what risks are acceptable. Judgements about the balance between consumer choice, on the one hand, and safety on the other, and therefore the legitimate role for government regulation, will only be socially acceptable if the public are involved at the outset' (1).
As far back as 1996, a report to the UK Health and Safety Executive on risk communication by government departments identified key factors for the success of risk communication (3), including:
-consultation processes, particularly the extent of involvement by interest groups and the public in policy-making and the way in which the governments involve them -public scepticism about government messages in the light of the history of earlier communication about a risk, compounded by low trust in government generally -difficulties that non-scientists have in understanding scientific information and methods, compounded by suspicion of science and technology generally -public preferences about different types of risk, which often lead to very different judgements from those in technical risk assessments -inadequate or inconsistent articulation or explanation by departments of their assessment of risk, sometimes reflecting more fundamental differences in decision frameworks.
Recent examples of risk communication about TSEs show that implementing these principles presents a major challenge for most food regulators.
The importance of risk communication and consumer perceptions
Communicating about risk is critically important since this is a process whereby acceptance of risks is acknowledged or not, as the case may be. Consumers are most concerned about those risks that directly affect their lives and families. Food safety, particularly in regard to BSE, the human form of the disease, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) and the impact on public health is a case in point. Safety is a negotiation about the acceptability of risks by those who are the bearers of the risks. Concerns about the risks from BSE and TSEs are heightened since consumers have little control in dealing with these risks.
Consumers have often been very confused about the risks from BSE and TSEs and have rejected and mistrusted risk communications. Research by the Consumers' Association (UK) in 1998, specifically considering BSE, demonstrated confusion and lack of trust of consumers in the information they had received about the disease (1). Four out of five people (81%) felt that information about whether meat was safe to eat changed constantly and 39% were confused about whether they could safely eat beef. More than half the consumers (60%) said that they did not have enough information about BSE or wanted to know more about the risks associated with the disease (51%). The majority of those interviewed (57%) stated that they did not take any notice of BSE anymore. The study also suggested that reports on possible transmission to sheep had had a small, but significant, impact on the consumption of lamb.
The perception and reactions of consumers to risk are often very different from those of experts and depend on factors such as:
-the nature and magnitude of the risk -the uncertainties of the risk -the 'fear factor' -the nature of any benefits -trust in those assessing and managing the risks.
Experts tend to focus on the quantifiable aspects of risks, while non-experts tend to be more concerned about qualitative aspects. Consequently, experts are often frustrated by the response of consumers to risk, complaining that if only they understood probability better, they would view risks as they really are and would not respond so 'irrationally', especially to food safety scares as 'exposed' in the media. Clearly, there is often a mismatch of risk perceptions between experts and consumers. Nevertheless, acceptance of the concerns, views and attitudes of consumers towards risk, however 'apparently unreasonable', is key for risk communicators. Without this fundamental understanding (which has to be developed through constructive, two-way iterative dialogues), there will be little if any trust in the messages or the messengers of food safety risks. Trust in risk communication can only be built on the credibility of the process whereby risks have been assessed and managed and the extent to which consumers and other stakeholders have been involved throughout the process.
The UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) set up a BSE Stakeholders' Group in 2001 comprising scientists, farming, food industry and consumer group representatives. This group considered risk reduction measures for the theoretical risk of BSE in sheep and advised the FSA on the application of precautionary measures. The process was open, transparent and inclusive, and perhaps most significantly, there was little if any media hype or hysteria about the proposed outcomes and little impact on the consumption of lamb. The public and the media appeared to trust the resulting communications from this forum.
Dealing with uncertainty
Previous chapters of this review have dealt with the current state of scientific knowledge of TSEs and have identified areas where there is lack of scientific evidence, or uncertainty, requiring further work. Whilst the enormous scientific efforts made over the past decade are recognised, there are still many 'uncertainties' concerning scientific evidence about BSE, TSEs and vCJD. However, even when faced with uncertainties, regulatory decisions and communications have to be made. The public has a right to be informed and expects governments to carry out their role in reducing food risks and exposure of consumers to these hazards. Regulatory authorities must adopt practices to ensure that food is safe to eat, based on available scientific knowledge, and ensure that any decisions are properly communicated to consumers, which could possibly be before sufficient scientific data is available. Communicating uncertainty is one of the most difficult and critical aspects of risk communication about TSEs.
The Joint WHO/FAO/Office International des Epizooties (OIE: World organisation for animal health) Technical Consultation on BSE addressed the issue of uncertainty in risk communication and concluded that there were four contexts for typical risk communication messages (9) , as follows:
-issues where the answers are thought to be known (high certainty contexts), recognising that new data can change the conclusions in which the highest confidence has been placed. For example: whether food exposure is the cause of vCJD -issues where the answer is not known (high uncertainty contexts). For example: how many people might be affected by vCJD in the future -issues where debate or controversy exists (moderate uncertainty). For example: whether BSE has spread to the rest of the world -new emerging issues of potential risk. For example: sheep and goats may have been infected with BSE.
Risk communicators should identify a given situation and adopt appropriate strategies for explaining these contexts to the public. The Phillips Report on the BSE Inquiry in the UK firmly concludes that, based on experience, a policy of openness is the correct approach. 'When responding to public or media demand for advice, the Government must resist the temptation of attempting to appear to have all the answers in a situation of uncertainty' (10) . The authors of the report are of the firm opinion that food scares thrive on a belief that the Government is withholding information. The evidence from consumer research supports this view. Withholding, or being perceived to be withholding information can cause more harm than good, fostering a climate of uncertainty and fear. A Consumers' Association survey conducted in April 1996, following the announcement of a possible link between BSE and vCJD (after years during which beef had been pronounced as safe to eat), demonstrated that 71% of consumers thought that the government had withheld information regarding the risks associated with BSE (5). The Phillips Report recommended that 'if doubts are openly expressed and publicly explored, the public is capable of responding rationally and is more likely to accept reassurance and advice if and when it comes' (10).
Building confidence and trust
Effective risk communication should build public confidence in regulators. The public should be reassured that their concerns and fears have been heard and addressed and consequently, then will be more likely to trust any information provided.
Involving consumers or consumer organisation representatives in the risk analysis process, and especially in risk communication, will improve confidence, and should ensure that there is more chance of 'one' clear message being communicated to the public.
The media will have less opportunity to cause confusion and exploit any weakness in communications if the regulators and all stakeholders are communicating the same message to the public and to their respective sectors.
Conversely, there was a complete lack of trust in the UK when many of the reassurances about the 'absolute' safety of beef issued from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) were demonstrated to have been unfounded. Public trust in government and in science was severely shaken when fears about the threat of the BSE epidemic in cattle for human health were confirmed in March 1996. The UK Government announced, despite previous strong reassurances to the contrary, that a human form of BSE was suspected, ten cases of new vCJD having been identified. For over ten years, there had been public concern about the risks to human health from the epidemic of BSE in cattle and these worse fears had been confirmed.
Public reassurances about the safety of beef were shattered. The UK beef industry plunged into crisis, consumption of beef slumped and exports were prohibited. In February 2002, research of the UK Food Standards Agency showed that 55% of consumers were still concerned about BSE (7), although this figure had fallen 6% from the previous year. Uncertainties about the future development of vCJD in the population and the problems of trying to eliminate the risks of BSE from the food and feed chain world-wide now have to be faced. Given the scientific uncertainties, communicating about the risks to human health against this background is indeed a major challenge. However, there are lessons to be learned and good practices to follow. Guidelines to regulators for good media communications were developed at the Joint FAO/WHO/OIE Technical Consultation on BSE and are included in the Appendix below.
In the UK, where public trust in food controls was most dented, issues about the theoretical spread of TSEs to sheep and goats have not been received with the same public outcry as was the BSE situation. Many factors have no doubt contributed to this change in public response, for example, the establishment of an independent FSA. However, the way in which information about the possible risks of BSE in sheep and goats has been communicated to the public has clearly changed. Stakeholders were involved in advising on precautionary measures against the theoretical risk of BSE in sheep. The advice of the FSA was unchanged against a background of uncertainty and was communicated clearly and openly, with consumers being advised about informed choices that could be made to reduce the risks. Good risk communication was highly appreciated. 6. Be proactive, take the initiative to communicate new information about risks, even though it may be unsettling to the public. Explain what is being done to address these risks.'
Confidence in food regulators -to protect consumer health and to ensure fair trade practices throughout the risk analysis process -must be negotiated by applying these fundamental recommendations about risk communication.
This was especially so since a special briefing was held with representatives of the Muslim, Asian and African-Caribbean communities, which traditionally eat meat from older sheep and goats. One delegate commented 'It is a difficult situation, but one that we now have some knowledge about to be able to make personal choices.' (8) Principles for good risk communication
In summary, much has been written about the problems of risk communication. When faced with scientific uncertainty, and when human health is at risk, the media always look for a new food scare to exploit. In the past, there was much to criticise about the way risks from BSE were communicated. However, lessons have been learned from earlier mistakes. The principles of good risk communication are clear and need to be steadfastly employed.
In conclusion, reiterating the principles identified as a result of the Joint FAO/WHO/OIE Technical Consultation on BSE is important (9) . These are as follows: 
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